ADR Case Updates
"Approved As To Form And Content" May Bind Counsel; Unconscionability; Drafting Settlement Agreements with Payments; PAGA; ERISA; and More, 09/04/2019
Cal. Supreme Court Holds That Attorney Who Sighs A Settlement Agreement Approving It as To Form and Content May Be Liable for Breaching the Agreement's Confidentiality Clause
In Monster Energy Drink v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, the California Supreme Court ruled an attorney who signs a settlement agreement approving it as to form and content may be liable for breaching the agreement's confidentiality clause. The opinion held the "approved as to form and content" notation above the lawyer's signature does not, as a matter of law, "preclude a factual finding that counsel both recommended their clients sign the document and intended to by bound by its provisions."
A 14-year old girl died of cardiac arrest after drinking two cans of an energy drink. Her family retained Attorney Bruce Schechter and his firm to file a wrongful death action on their behalf against Monster Energy Company. The lawsuit ultimately settled.
The settlement agreement included a confidentiality clause that was not only extensive, but referred repeatedly to both the parties and their counsel. Specifically, it provided that plaintiffs and their counsel agreed to "keep completely confidential all of the terms and contents of this Settlement Agreement," and further provided the parties and their attorneys would not make any statements about the action or Monster's "products in relation to this Action, in the media," which was defined to include the Internet. Any comment "shall be limited to the following, or words to their effect: 'This matter has been resolved.'" Schechter signed the agreement under a signature block, "Approved As To Form and Content."
Shortly after, an article appeared on the website Lawyersandsettlements.com entitled, "Substantial Dollars for Family of Monster Energy Drink Wrongful Death Suit." It attributed several quotes to Schechter about the case, describing how it resulted in "substantial dollars" for the family, although "Monster wants the amount to be sealed." The article also mentioned Schechter's belief that Monster's products were unsafe, described three other lawsuits he had filed against Monster, and concluded with a link and phone number for "Monster Energy Drink Injury Legal Help."
Monster filed suit against Schechter and his firm for breach of contract. In turn, the attorneys filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation), and argued that Monster could not show a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim because they were not parties to the settlement agreement. The trial court denied the attorneys' motion, allowing Monster's case to proceed, observing that "Schechter's suggestion that he is not a party to the contract merely because he approved it as to form and content only is beyond reason." The Court of Appeal reversed.
Reversed: Justice Carol Corrigan authored the unanimous opinion and applied rudimentary contract law principles to the settlement agreement, concluding the language of the confidentiality provision clearly purported to bind the parties and their counsel. The question was one of mutual consent, "determined by objective rather than subjective criteria, the test being what the outward manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to believe." Did Schechter's signature on the agreement, in light of the substantive provisions in the confidentiality clause that unequivocally applied to him, manifest his consent to be bound by those provisions?
The opinion makes clear that approving a document as to form and content will not bind counsel where no substantive provisions purport to do so. On the other hand, a lawyer's signature to a document imposing duties on counsel may evince an intent to be bound, even though the attorney is also approving the client's signature. "Here, a factfinder considering all of the circumstances could reasonably conclude Schechter agreed to be bound."
Cal. Supreme Court Rules Arbitration Agreement Unconscionable By Denying Employee Right To Cost-Free Berman Procedure Under Labor Code
In OTO L.L.C. v. Kho, 2019 WL 4065524 (Cal. Aug. 29, 2019), a divided California Supreme Court considered the enforceability of an agreement requiring arbitration of wage disputes. Justice Carol Corrigan wrote for the majority. Justice Ming Chin dissented.
Ken Kho was hired as a service technician for One Toyota of Oakland (OTO) in January 2010. Three years later, a human resources "porter" approached Kho in his workstation and asked him to sign several documents. Kho was required to sign them immediately and return them to the porter, who waited in the workstation. It took Kho three or four minutes to sign them all. He had no opportunity to read them, nor were their contents explained. Kho's first language was Chinese. He was not given copies of the documents in either language. One document was titled "Comprehensive Agreement-Employment At-Will and Arbitration, and contained an arbitration clause. After Kho's Employment ended, he filed a complaint for unpaid wages with the Labor Commissioner. One day before the scheduled Berman hearing, OTO filed a petition to compel arbitration, but did not serve copies on Kho. OTO's attorney appeared at the hearing, served Kho with the petition, and left. The hearing officer proceeded with the hearing and awarded Kho $102,912 in unpaid wages and $55,634 in liquidated damages, interest, and penalties. OTO sought to vacate the award, and the Labor Commissioner intervened and opposed. The trial court vacated the award but refused to compel arbitration due to unconscionability of the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding the agreement was not substantively unconscionable.
Reversed and remanded: A contract is unconscionable if one party lacked meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree, and the contract contained terms unreasonably favorable to the other party. For an agreement to be unenforceable, both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present. Procedural unconscionability addresses circumstances underlying "contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power." Substantive unconscionability "pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided." Here, an extraordinarily high degree of procedural unconscionability existed, considering Kho was given the agreement in his workspace, the document was not explained, OTO conveyed an expectation Kho sign immediately, and its terms made complex legal references throughout. Further, sufficient substantive unconscionability existed because OTO's document did not instruct employees how to initiate arbitration and OTO's arbitration process incorporated intricacies of civil litigation, essentially forcing Kho to forgo his right to the expedient, generally cost-free, administrative Berman procedures provided by the Labor Code.
Settlement Agreement May Not Include Impermissible Penalty by Requiring Defendant to Pay More Than Agreed Upon Sum in Event of Default (But Agreement May Provide for a Discount Off Agreed Upon Sum If Payments Timely Made)
In Red & White Distribution v. Osteroid Enterprises, 2019 WL 3759458 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2019), Red & White Distribution, LLC, (R&W) borrowed $1.8 million from Osteroid Enterprises, LLC. After Osteroid declared the loan in default, R&W filed a complaint alleging the loan was usurious and unenforceable. The parties then settled the dispute for $2.1 million pursuant to a "Payment Agreement," which included a schedule with varying installment amounts to be paid by R&W over time. The parties also executed a stipulation for entry of judgment that stated in the event of a default on the payment plan, R&W is "liable to pay $2,800,000 to the Osteroid Parties," less payments made. Years later, Osteroid filed an ex parte application to enforce the stipulated judgment, which the trial court granted. R&W appealed, arguing the additional $700,000 was an impermissible penalty.
Reversed: Under Civil Code Section 1671(b), "a provision in a contract liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the contract was made." A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable if it "bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach." In this case, the parties entered into a settlement agreement providing that if R&W defaulted, the Osteroid could file a stipulation for entry of judgment, with the amount of the judgment totaling $700,000 more than the settlement amount, plus interest and attorneys' fees. The trial court erred in entering the stipulated judgment because the additional $700,000 was an unenforceable penalty under Section 1671.
Practice Pointer: The appellate court's opinion provides guidance regarding how to "incentivize prompt payments properly" when drafting a settlement agreement and stipulation for entry of judgment. If the parties stipulate that the debt is a certain number, they may agree that it may be discharged for that number minus some amount. They may also agree that in the event the debtor does not timely make the agreed payments, a stipulated judgment may be entered for the full amount. Here, the parties structured their agreement as an impermissible penalty. R&W never admitted it owed $2.8 million. Rather, the settlement agreement states R&W is "liable to pay to the Osteroid Parties $2,100,000.00 ("Total Payment Plan Amount") plus interest thereon ..." and provided that judgment would be entered for $2.8 million in the event of default. Had the parties intended to settle for $2.8 million, but apply a discount for timely payments, they should have done so expressly by including terms in the agreement stating R&W is liable to pay the Osteroid $2.8 million, but so long as all payments are timely made in accordance with the payment schedule, the amount due shall be discounted to $2.1 million.
Employer May Not Compel Arbitration of Employee's PAGA Claim By "Splitting" Individual Claim and Collective Claim Because "One Injury Gives Rise to Only One Claim for Relief"
In Mejia v. Merchants Building Maintenance, LLC, 2019 WL 3798067 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2019), Lorena Mejia worked for Merchants Building Maintenance, LLC, a provider of janitorial services. Mejia was a union member during her employment with the defendants under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). A provision in the CBA required that bargaining-unit employees resolve their private wage and hour disputes on an "individual basis" by following a mediation and arbitration protocol which, pursuant to the terms of the CBA, was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Mejia filed a single cause of action under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Labor Code Section 2698 et seq.) alleging various Labor Code wage and hour violations. In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, the California Supreme Court held that individual employees cannot contractually agree to arbitrate their "individual damages claims." Defendants moved to compel arbitration of one aspect of Mejia's individual's claims. They contended that her claim to recover the portion of the civil penalty under Labor Code Section 558 that represented underpaid wages amounted to a claim for individual damages because it sought "victim-specific relief." They further argued that because plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any individual claim for unpaid wages, any such claim must be split and sent to arbitration. Only that portion of plaintiff's claim under Section 558 that seeks to recover the $50 or $100 per violation per employee civil penalty is not subject to arbitration. The trial court denied the motion.
Affirmed: "The language of Section 558(a) is more reasonably construed as providing a civil penalty that consists of both the $50 or $100 penalty amount and any underpaid wages." The monetary assessments together with the "amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages" provided for in Section 558 comprises a single civil penalty. Thus, a single PAGA claim seeking such penalties cannot be "split" into an individual claim and a collective claim because "one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief."
ERISA Claims Are Subject to Arbitration (9th Cir.)
In Dorman v. Charles Schwab Corp., 2019 WL 3926990 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2019), Michael Dorman was employed by Charles Schwab and Company, Inc. and joined the Schwab Retirement Savings and Investment Plan (Plan). He voluntarily contributed to his account through payroll deductions until his employment ended, and he withdrew his account balance shortly thereafter. Before leaving Schwab, he enrolled in the Schwab Investor Financial Consultant Compensation Plan. Both plans included arbitration provisions and class action waivers. Dorman later filed a class action complaint against Schwab and others under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 Sections 502 (a)(2) and (a)(3). He alleged defendants breached fiduciary duties by including Schwab-affiliated investment funds in the Plan. Schwab moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, holding that even if Dornan's claims fell under the arbitration agreements, they were unenforceable since class-action waivers required as a condition of employment were unenforceable.
Reversed and remanded: In Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 727 F.2d 747 (9th Cir 1983), the Ninth Circuit held ERISA mandated "minimum standards for assuring the equitable character of ERISA plans," which arbitral proceedings could not satisfy. However, if an "intervening Supreme Court decision undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on point, "the court may overrule prior circuit authority." In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held federal statutory claims are generally arbitrable and arbitrators can competently interpret and apply federal statutes. That "intervening Supreme Court authority" was irreconcilable with Amaro, which was no longer good law in light of Italian Colors Restaurant. Therefore, ERISA claims are subject to mandatory arbitration.
Arbitration Agreement Retroactively Applies To Claims Filed Before It Was Signed, So Long As Language Is Clear and No Qualifying Language Limits Applicability
In Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium, 2019 WL 3811889 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2019), employees of defendant Greystone Ridge Condominium, including plaintiff Victor M. Quiroz Franco, were presented with and asked to sign an agreement requiring that each employee agree to submit to final and binding arbitration "[a]ny and all claims ... relating to any aspect of ... employment with Employer (pre-hire through post-termination)." About 10 days later, plaintiff filed a complaint against Greystone, C & A Services, John Stokke, and Maher A.A. Azer (defendants) asserting employment-related claims. Two days after that, plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement and returned it to Greystone. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims which plaintiff opposed on the ground the arbitration agreement failed to expressly state that claims that had already accrued, including the claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint, were subject to arbitration. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration.
Reversed: The parties' arbitration agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal with regard to the claims subject to it and contains no qualifying language limiting its applicability to claims that had yet to accrue. On the contrary, the agreement's reference to claims relating to "pre-hire" matters expresses an intent to cover all claims, regardless of when they accrued, that are not otherwise expressly excluded by the arbitration agreement.
Under Business and Professions Code Section 17201, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims for Public Injunctive Relief Are Barred in California, But Private Injunctive Relief May Be Arbitrated
In Clifford v. Quest Software, Inc., 2019 WL 3812512 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2019), Daniel Clifford was employed by Quest Software, Inc., for several years. During his "Code of Conduct" training course, he agreed to the terms of the company's arbitration agreement and dispute resolution program. The arbitration agreement provided that the exclusive method of resolving any employment-related disputes would be arbitration, and also expressly stated that it applied to wage and hour disputes. Clifford later filed a complaint against Quest for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code Section 17200 (UCL), alleging unlawful wage and hour compensation. Clifford's complaint sought both restitution and injunctive relief. Quest moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to arbitrate the UCL claim, finding it was inarbitrable because it sought injunctive relief. Quest appealed.
Reversed in part: The arbitrability of UCL claims depends upon the type of relief sought by plaintiff. The California Supreme Court held that UCL claims for restitution "are fully arbitrable," but UCL claims for public injunctive relief are not. If a plaintiff's UCL cause of action includes both arbitrable and inarbitrable claims, such as a request for restitution and a request for public injunctive relief, the trial court must sever the causes of action. Additionally, "[a]greements to arbitrate claims for public injunctive relief under... the UCL... are not enforceable in California, but this only bars arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief. [P]ublic injunctive relief under the UCL is relief that has the primary purpose and effect of prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general public." Here, Clifford's UCL claim sought both injunctive relief and restitution, but Clifford was only seeking private injunctive relief. Therefore, his claim was not barred from arbitration. The private nature of his claim was clearly evident because the relief he sought dealt exclusively with his own violations, not with the violations done to other Quest employees or the public at large. On those grounds, the trial court was reversed in part.
Nursing Home Waived Right to Compel Arbitration by Litigating Before Renewing Its Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs Were Prejudiced by Incurring Costs (9th Cir.)
In Newirth v. Aegis Senior Communities, 931 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2019), June Newirth and Margaret Pierce, residents of senior living communities operated by Agis Senior Communities, LLC, entered into an agreement with Aegis that included in arbitration clause. Newirth filed a class action complaint against Aegis, alleging a scheme to defraud seniors. Aegis filed motions to dismiss and compel arbitration. Before those motions were heard, the parties enter into a stipulation whereby Newirth filed a second amended complaint and Aegis withdrew its motions. Later, Aegis filed a new motion to dismiss that made no mention of arbitration. For nearly a year, while the second motion to dismiss was pending, the parties actively engaged in discovery. The district court finally denied the motion to dismiss. Aegis then renewed its motion to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding that Aegis waived its right to arbitrate.
Affirmed: Under federal law, a party seeking to prove that the right to compel arbitration has been waived must demonstrate intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right and prejudice to the person opposing arbitration. Here, although Aegis promptly filed a motion to compel arbitration, it intentionally withdrew the motion to take advantage of the federal form by filing a motion to dismiss. Only after receiving an adverse ruling, did Aegis renew the motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, Aegis knowingly decided to defer its right to compel arbitration inconsistent with its known right to compel. Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the cost incurred in defending against the motion to dismiss the complaint on the merits. If the court had granted the renewed motion to compel arbitration, Newirth would have been forced "to relitigate a key legal issue [on the merits] on which the district court has ruled in [her] favor."
Nursing Home May Not Compel Arbitration Against Decedent's Children in Wrongful Death Action Because Arbitration Agreement Was Not Signed by Decedent's Representative as Her Agent
In Valentine v. Plum Health Care Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, Plum Healthcare Group LLC, operated a skilled nursing facility. Lila Valentine was admitted to the facility after breaking her right shoulder. Plum asked Lila's husband, Roy Valentine, to sign admission documents that included two arbitration agreements. Both agreements included a clause reporting to bind the resident's representatives to arbitrate claims. Roy signed his name as Lila's representative. Lila ultimately died. Roy and Lila's children filed an action for elder abuse and wrongful death. Plum petitioned to compel arbitration. The court found the arbitration agreements were valid as to Roy, not because he was Lila's agent, but because he expressly bound himself to arbitrate all claims he held individually. However, the court denied the petition because the children's claims were not subject to arbitration, and allowing the arbitration and the litigation to proceed concurrently could result in inconsistent findings of fact and law.
Affirmed: A person who is authorized to act as the patient's agent can bind the patient to an arbitration agreement. An ostensible agency is "when the principle intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him" (Civil Code, Section 2300). Nothing Lila did could reasonably cause Plum to believe Roy was authorized to execute arbitration agreements on her behalf. Roy testified Lila was capable to make her own healthcare decisions. She was present when he signed the documents, but she was unaware he was signing them or of what they were. Plum never told Lila about the paperwork, asked her if she could sign the documentation, or asked if Roy had authority to sign them as her agent.
Nursing Home's Arbitration Agreement Was Properly Found Unenforceable Due To Unconscionability, and the Appellate Court Deferred to the Trial Court's Credibility Determination Favoring Plaintiff In The Face Of Conflicting Evidence
Irene Lopez was admitted to Bartlett Care Center, LLC's French Park Care Center (Facility). Irene's daughter, Jasmine Lopez, signed a document entitled "Resident-Facility Arbitration Agreement," given to her by a Facility employee, Mariana Godinez. Jasmine and Godinez signed the document. Two months later, Irene was transferred to an acute care hospital and required amputation of her right leg due to a serious infection. She died shortly after. Jasmine sued the Facility under various causes of action. The Facility filed a petition to compel arbitration under the agreement Jasmine had signed. Godinez asserted she explained the agreement to Jasmine and Irene, and Irene explicitly authorized Jasmine to sign the agreement on Irene's behalf. Jasmine's declaration completely contradicted Godinez's claims. The trial court denied the Facility's petition and held the agreement was unenforceable as to Jasmine in her individual capacity due to unconscionability. Defendants appealed.
Affirmed: "A factual finding cannot be overturned on appeal simply because the record contains credible evidence to the contrary." Further, appellate courts "must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its valuations of credibility, if they are substantially supported." The appellate court found Jasmine's declaration opposing the Facility's petition constituted substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Specifically, Jasmine stated Irene never authorized her to sign any agreement on Irene's behalf, supporting the trial court's finding that Jasmine lacked actual agency to waive Irene's trial rights, and Jasmine's statement she signed the agreement outside Irene's presence supported the finding that Jasmine lacked ostensible agency. The appellate court thus deferred to the trial court's determination favoring Jasmine over Godinez. Further, the court denied the Facility's arguments against unconscionability, finding that nowhere did it warn that a non-resident signatory agreed to be bound in her individual capacity and representative capacity, and the agreement was blatantly one-sided in the Facility's favor.
Arbitration Clause May Not Purport to Waive Right to Seek Public Injunctive Relief Under California Supreme Court "McGill" Rule (9th Cir.)
In Blair v. Rent-A-Center, 928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019), Paula Blair entered into a rent-to-own agreement with Rent-A-Center (RAC) for an air conditioner and Xbox. The agreement included an arbitration clause. She later filed suit against RAC under California's Karnette Rental-Purchase Act (Civil Code Section 1812.620), which prohibits "unfair or unconscionable conduct toward consumers." She sought public injunctive relief requiring RAC to cease such activities. RAC moved to compel arbitration under the agreement, which precluded in paragraph D, an arbitration award that would "affect RAC account holders other than [Blair]." Paragraph B of the agreement stipulated that RAC could elect to have all disputes heard in arbitration. RAC's motion was denied, based on a finding that the arbitration agreement precluded public injunctive relief, contrary to the California Supreme Court holding in McGill v. Citibank, N.A. (2017) 2 Cal. 5th 945.
Affirmed: The Federal Arbitration Act's saving clause (9 U.S.C. Section 2) allows courts to invalidate agreements to arbitrate based on "generally applicable contract defenses." With the McGill rule, the California Supreme Court held that "waiver of public injunctive relief in any contract - even a contract that has no arbitration provision - is unenforceable under California law." The rule "thus applied equally to arbitration and non-arbitration agreements." That differentiates it from the Broughton-Cruz rule (Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal. [1999] 21 Cal.4th 1066, and Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., [2003] 30 Cal.4th 303), that the Ninth Circuit found preempted by the FAA in Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 733 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2013), because the Broughton-Cruz rule prohibited "outright" the arbitration of public injunctive relief. On the contrary, "[T]he McGill rule ... shows no hostility to, and does not prohibit, the arbitration of public in junctions. It merely prohibits the waiver of the right to pursue public injunctive relief in any forum." Thus, the McGill rule "is a generally applicable contract defense," and is "a ground for the revocation of any contract and falls within the FAA's saving clause at the first step of the preemption analysis." Because paragraph (D) "precludes the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief," and paragraph (B) permitted arbitration at RAC's election, the paragraphs together "wave Blair's right to seek a public injunction in any forum," and thus violate the McGill rule.
Trial Court's Order Compelling Arbitration of Plaintiff's Individual Claims and Deferring to Arbitrator Question of Classwide Arbitration Was Not Appealable
In Lacayo v. Catalina Restaurant Group, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 244, Yalila Lacayo was an employee of the Catalina Defendants (Catalina Restaurant Group, Inc., Carrows Restaurants, Inc., Carrows Family Restaurants, Inc., Coco's Bakery Restaurants, Inc. and Coco's Restaurants, Inc.). She filed a class action complaint alleging numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, and seeking injunctive relief under California's Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) Defendants responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration of Lacayo's individual claims, including the UCL claim, and dismissal of the class claims. The trial court granted the motion as to Lacayo's individual claims; refused to dismiss the class claims, instead letting the arbitrator decide if the class claims were subject to arbitration or a class action waiver; and denied the motion as to the UCL claim; and stayed the matter until after arbitration was completed.
Affirmed: Code of Civil Procedure Section 1294 (a) authorizes an aggrieved party to appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration. On the other hand, orders compelling arbitration are considered interlocutory and are not appealable. An order directing arbitration should be affirmed unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration provision is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Here, the trial court's orders granting Defendants' motion as to Plaintiff's individual claims and refusing to dismiss the class claims, instead of leaving the decision on classwide arbitration to the arbitrator, were not appealable. Moreover, the arbitration agreement at issue contained a specific exemption for unfair competition claims, which stated unequivocally that either party to the agreement could petition a court for injunctive or equitable relief for unfair competition. Therefore, the trial court's ruling denying the motion to compel arbitration of the UCL claim was correct.
California opinions are posted at: click here, and the Ninth Circuit opinion at: click here.
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